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Federal review of state court convictions is a point of conflict between
state and federal courts and has been for some time. It has been called:
The most controversial and friction-producing issue in the relation between
the federal courts and the states. Commentators are critical of its present
scope, federal judges unhappy at the burden of thousands of mostly
frivolous petitions, state courts resent having their decisions reexamined by
a single federal district judge. Meanwhile, prisoners thrive on it as a form
of occupational therapy and for a few it serves as a means of redressing
constitutional violations.'
Some state judges resent the presumption of state court incompetence
implicit in federal review.2 Looking at habeas corpus petitions filed over a
forty year period, it is clear that the federal court review of state convictions
began in earnest in 1963 when the U.S. District Courts, rather than the U.S.
Supreme Court, became the primary means of federal court review of state
court judgments.3 Even though the number of state prisoners has nearly
quadrupled in the past twenty-five years, the rate of habeas filings per
prisoner has declined steadily. The Federal Courts Study Committee
attributes the decline to Supreme Court decisions that make habeas more
difficult to obtain.4 The volume of habeas petitions from state prisoners is
generated largely by convictions in nine states. These petitions generate
work for magistrates and district court judges because they must be reviewed
for constitutional violations, but the petitions represent only a small portion
of civil cases filed in U.S. District Courts, and the vast majority are
dismissed. In 1992, for example, habeas petitions from state prisoners
terminated by U.S. District Courts (10,688) represented four and seven-
tenths percent of civil cases terminated (226,596). Ninety-four percent of
these were denied.5
Despite the fact that many of the important and interesting debating
points about habeas corpus are empirical questions, the amount of data
brought to bear on this topic are almost nonexistent. David L. Shapiro
i. CHARLES A. VRIGHT ET AL., 17A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261 (2d ed. 1988).
2. Tension between state and federal judges is engendered when "a single federal judge may overturn
the judgment of the highest court of a state" Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543.-44 (1981). On the
other hand, some state judges have testified as to the necessity of federal oversight. Justice Garter, a
former state judge, noted to us that the very existence of the federal writ has resulted in state court
improvements. See also Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1755 (1993).
3. The U.S. Supreme Court changed criteria for review of state criminal cases in 1963. See Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Townsend v. San, 372 U.S.
293 (1963).
4. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITEE REPORTS 471 (July
1, 1991). The Committee also notes that lack of prisoner success in obtaining habeas review combined
with the liberalizing of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner petitions, which may also have "deflected" prisoner
attention from habeas corpus petitions to civil rights suits, are other reasons for the decline in petitions
per prisoner.
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decried the lack of empirical studies on habeas corpus twenty years ago, 6
and only two empirically-based works have been written since that time. 7
This is only the second multisite study of habeas corpus ever completed and
the only one to include data from state courts as well as federal courts.
By presenting some recent empirical data on habeas corpus, this paper
seeks to reduce the number of issues in contention and hence focus the debate
more clearly. Part I of the article presents the research design, Part II the
characteristics of petitioners, Part III the types of claims raised, Part IV the
success rates of petitioners by claims raised, and Part V the conclusions.
I. THE RESEARCH DESIGN
Ideally, it would be desirable to track the same set of cases from state
court to federal court. This would permit a comparison of the claims raised
in federal court with those raised earlier in state court. The problem with
this design is that it is not possible to obtain a pure sample of cases not
appealed to federal court because there is currently no time limit governing
when a state prisoner may file a habeas corpus petition in federal court.
Thus, there is always the potential for a person to file in federal court.
Besides this, the time required to track cases through state and federal courts
would be prohibitive. Consequently, separate state and federal samples were
drawn.
A. The Sample
The Advisory Committee to this research effort recommended that staff
use states, rather than federal districts, as units of analysis and set the criteria
for site selection. Criteria included:
* The absolute number of habeas petitions filed in federal court.
In effect this criterion mandated the selection of larger states
which would have sufficient petitions filed from which to draw a
representative sample;
6. David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. REV. 321(1973). Shapiro's research was conducted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for
the years ending June 30, 1970, 1971, and 1972.
7. These are Paul H. Robinson, An Empirical Study of Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court
Judgments (Washington, D.C.: Federal Justice Research Program, Office for Improvements in the
Administration of Justice, 1979) and Richard Faust etal., The Great Writ in Action: EmpiricalLight on
the FederalHabeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 650 (1990-91). The Faust,
Rubenstein, and Yackle research was based upon data from the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
New York for the time periods 1973-75 and 1979-81. A study by Robinson for the Department of
Justice, completed in 1979, was the only study prior to this one to use data from more than one U.S.
District Court. None of the previous empirical studies included a comparison group of state court habeas
petitions. U.S. Districts included in his sample included the Central District of California, the Northern
District of Illinois, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of New Jersey. The Southern District
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* The proportion of habeas petitions to state prisoner populations;
" The geographic diversity among sites chosen to represent differ-
ent regions of the country;
o The states with a death penalty and states without the death
penalty;
o The states having the court records necessary to complete the
study. 8
Given these parameters, the four states chosen for the study were
California, New York, Texas, and Alabama. All had sufficient numbers of
petitions filed in federal courts and, considered collectively, represent
geographic diversity. Alabama had the highest ratio of habeas corpus
petitions filed to prisoner population and was included in the four states
studied.9
Samples of habeas petitions were drawn from the state's highest criminal
courts to ensure a sample that was representative of petitions filed in the
entire state. The exception was New York where the Court of Appeals had
very few petitions filed, so the sample was drawn in the intermediate
appellate courts and one trial court. Staff had expected to find many habeas
petitions filed in the densely populated Manhattan and Brooklyn areas and
were surprised at the relative small number of petitions filed in this area.
Court personnel suggested that the reason few petitions were filed may be
that very few prisons are located within the city and that prisoners may be
8. Data supporting the selection criteria are as follows:
Sufficient Number of Habeas Corpus Death Penalty Prisoners Under
Habeas Corpus Filings Petitions as Sentence of Death,
U.S. District Courts by Percentage of April 1991
State- 1990 Prisoners
California 1,070 1% yes 299
New York 663 1% no 0
Texas 918 2% yes 335
Florida 589 1% yes 295
Pennsylvania 590 3% yes 132
Michigan 411 1% no 0
Ohio 303 1% yes 99
Missouri 539 4% yes 73
Indiana 356 3% yes 53
Tennessee 303 4% yes 85
Louisiana 462 3% yes 34
Alabama 562 5% yes 109
Kentucky 281 4% yes 27
9. Michigan and Pennsylvania were actively considered as well. Michigan was attractive because
of the ready access of staff already working there and because Michigan does not have a death penalty.
Examination of records on site, however, revealed that too few cases were filed in state court to warrant
inclusion in the study. For example, our on-site research in Wayne County established that only 46
habeas petitions were filed in 1991, and only 24 were filed in Ingham County, the state capital. Habeas
cannot be used to challenge a conviction in Michigan and there is virtually an automatic right to appeal
to the Court of Appeals. MCL § 750.321, MSA § 28.553. Consequently, there were only six cases
appealed to the Court of Appeal in 1989, 12 in 1990, and 12 in 1991. Pennsylvania is similar to
Michigan in that the vast majority of habeas petitions are brought under the Post Conviction Relief Act.
There are few habeas petitions per se and records kept in trial courts to not identify habeas petitions
separately.
4
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filing petitions in the locations where they are incarcerated. Wyoming
County is the location of Attica Prison, however, and very few petitions were
filed there either. This may indicate that New York state courts do not
receive an abundance of habeas filings. This conclusion seems logical, for
in California, Alabama, and Texas, the staff had no problem collecting over
three hundred state habeas claims from the targeted years of 1990 and 1992.
This was surprising considering New York's large prison population. The
finding may be partially explained by the fact that New York was the only
non-death penalty state in this study.'" The courts participating in the
research and sample sizes are listed as follows:
Table 1
Sample Sizes
Number of Number of
State Courts Petitioners Federal Courts Petitioners
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 381 Middle District of Alabama 258
Southern District of Alabama 45
Supreme Court of California 507 Northern District of California 152
Eastern District of California 156
Supreme Court of the State Southern District of N.Y. 213
of New York, Appellate Division, Eastern Division of N.Y. 274
First Judicial Department 35
Second Judicial Department 243
Supreme Court of N.Y.,
Wyoming County 29
TX Court of Criminal Appeals 640 Northern District of Texas 136
Southern District of Texas 392
Totals 1,835 1,626
Creating a comparison group of state habeas cases was more difficult
than anticipated. In California and Texas, writs of habeas corpus are the
primary post-judgment remedies." In New York and Alabama, however,
many of the actions brought in federal courts as habeas corpus petitions are
brought in other state court writs. To facilitate meaningful comparisons
10. Prisoner population in New York was 53,359 in 1990. The rate of habeas filings was one
percent in New York; the same rate as in California, but lower than the two percent in Texas and the five
percent rate in Alabama.
11. In Texas, the petitions granted by the state Court of Criminal Appeals were oversampled, because
granted petitions were stored separately from petitions that were denied or dismissed. The rate of granting
petitions is so low in all courts that a larger than usual sampling of granted petitions was coded to
facilitate analysis of the reasons why petitions were granted. The number of habeas corpus petitions filed
in death penalty cases before the California Supreme Court was oversampled for similar reasons.
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among sites, data were collected on Rule 440 petitions in New York" and
Rule 32 petitions in Alabama 3 as well as habeas petitions filed in all courts.
II. PETITIONER CHARACTERISTICS
What type of prisoners file habeas corpus petitions? Prior research
shows that most petitioners filing habeas petitions have been convicted of a
serious offense.'4 The percentages differ somewhat, because prior studies
recorded multiple offenses, and, thus, do not equal one hundred percent.
12. In New York, this research found that the habeas petition itself is used primarily to challenge
bail. Other procedures are used to make claims that would be habeas claims in other states. Some of
these grounds (e.g., failure to seek continuances), may entitle petitioners to a new trial, but not to be
released as a habeas corpus remedy would provide. Rule 440 motions were collected in the research sites
also to enable the coders to pick up the equivalent of habeas petitions in other states. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 440 (Consol. 1970). (Ineffective assistance of counsel may also be raised in a corant nobis
application). Section 440.10 motions to vacatejudgment provides that the court may vacate the judgment
upon the motion of the defendant if: 1) the court did not have jurisdiction of the action or of the person
of the defendant; 2) the judgment was procured by duress, misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the
court, prosecutor, or a person acting on behalf of the court or a prosecutor; 3) material evidence adduced
at the trial resulting in the judgment was false and was, prior to the entry of the judgment, known by the
prosecution or by the court to be false; 4) material evidence presented by the prosecution at trial was
procured in violation of the defendant's rights under the New York Constitution or the United States
Constitution; 5) during the proceedings which resulted in judgment against the defendant, the defendant
was incapable of understanding or participating in such proceedings; 6) improper and prejudicial conduct
not appearing in the record occurred during the trial which resulted in the judgment, if this conduct had
appeared in the record it would have required a reversal of judgment upon an appeal therefrom; 7) new
evidence has been discovered since the entry of the guilty judgment, which could not have been produced
by the defendant at the trial even with due diligence on his part and if the evidence had been received at
trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based upon this
ground must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence; or 8) thejudgment was obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the New York state Constitution or
the United States Constitution. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (Consol. 1970). There is no statute
of limitations on any of the 440 motions. Id., Practice Commentary by Joseph W. Bellacosa at 320.
Joseph W. Bellacosa, Practice Commentary in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW, supra at 320. Many petitioners
used the Rule 440 motion to argue ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v. Prentilce, 459
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1983), where the court states that any claim that the defendant was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel should be resolved by the trial court on motion to vacatejudgment. Every defendant
has one automatic appeal, therefore many issues raised in habeas petitions in other states can be addressed
on direct appeal here.
13. Alabama also has an alternative post-conviction remedy in Rule 32, which is a slight modification
to former Rule 20. ALA. CT. C.P.R. 32. Any defendant convicted of a criminal offense may seek relief
if the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law, if the court was without jurisdiction to
render judgment, if the petitioner is being held in custody after the petitioner's sentence has expired, if
newly discovered material facts exist that were not known at the time of trial or sentencing and if known
would have changed the result, or if the United States Constitution or Alabama Constitution requires a
new trial, a new sentence proceeding, or other relief. ALA. CT. C.P.R. 32. 1. Rule 32 forbids successive
petitions, thus, many Rule 32 petitions tend to raise multiple claims. ALA. CT. C.P.R. 32.2 (3).
14. Robinson, supra note 7, at 7; Faust et al., supra note 7, at 678.
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 31 [1994], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol31/iss2/3
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE CONVICTIONS
Table 2
Habeas Petitioners by Original Offense
Offenses State Federal Robinson Faust et al.' 5
Homicide 30% 22% 21% 29%
Robbery 18% 22% 23% 30%
Sexual Assault 6  10% 9%
Assault 5% 7% 13% 11%
Burglary/Theft 16% 13%
Drug Offenses 12% 15% 12%
Other 10% 12% 55%
Number of Petitions 1,569 1,484 1,899 585
This study counts only the most serious offenses the petitioners
committed. Nevertheless, the study confirms the conclusion of prior work
that habeas petitioners were likely to be convicted of serious offenses. It
includes more categories of offenses than prior studies so that burglary/theft,
for example, is separated from robbery convictions, because robbery includes
physical harm as well as theft.
Habeas petitioners are more likely than other prisoners to have been
convicted by jury trial. Research in twenty-six urban areas reveals that the
jury trial rate for felony convictions averages six percent, 7 yet the majority
of habeas petitioners in our study were convicted by jury trial (sixty-two
percent of the state court sample and sixty-six percent of the federal court
sample). Our study indicates that convictions by jury trial are much higher
than convictions by bench trial (only four percent of petitioners in the state
sample and eight percent of the federal sample), guilty pleas (thirty-two
percent of the state samples and twenty-four percent of the federal sample),
or nolo contendere (three percent of the state petitioners and two percent of
the federal). Considering the fact that a high proportion of convictions are
achieved by guilty pleas, a greater representation of guilty pleas among
habeas petitioners may have been expected. Guilty pleas obviously do not
prevent prisoner's filing of a habeas petition, but may reduce the number of
issues about which the petitioner may complain. Robinson also suggests that
petitioners may believe their chances of successful habeas petition are less
after a guilty plea because it is less convincing to maintain innocence after
pleading guilty.' 8 In any event, it is clear that habeas petitions are not used
15. The Faust figures are total percentages, obtained by combining the 1973-1975 and 1979-1981
percentages.
16. The sexual assault category includes rapes, molestation, and any other sexual types of offense.
17. J. GOERDT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING COURT DELAY (1989). These
figures comport well with the state figures in Court Statistics Project, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, STATECOURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUALREPORT, 1988 Williamsburg, Va., which reports
felony jury trial rates from 12 states. These rates range from 2.1 percent in Texas to 6.9 percent in
Alaska.
18. Robinson, supra note 7, at 8.
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by a representative sample of all convicted state prisoners, but rather by the
smaller proportion of prisoners who are generally imprisoned as a result of
a jury trial for committing serious offenses.
Only prisoners sentenced to a longer term have time to complete the
lengthy procedures prerequisite to filing a habeas corpus petition. 9 As a
consequence of being convicted of a serious offense after a jury trial, it is not
surprising that our research indicates that the length of the sentences of
habeas petitioners is long. Our study indicates that the median sentences in
state courts range from a minimum sentence of twenty-four years to a
maximum of thirty years and sixteen to twenty-four years for petitioners in
federal courts.
Perhaps also as a consequence of the seriousness of the offense,
petitioners were likely to have been represented in state court during the trial.
Data on the type of attorney, however, was the single most difficult
characteristic to find in the transcripts, and half of the habeas records
reviewed had no information on the type of representation the convicted
individual received at trial. The data that were available (894 petitioners out
of 1,835 in the state sample) reveals that sixty-four percent of the prisoners
received court-appointed counsel, nine percent had public defenders, nineteen
percent had contract attorneys, and eight percent represented themselves. Of
the 1,093 petitioners in federal court for whom data were available, seventy-
eight percent had court-appointed counsel or public defenders in the trial
court, twelve percent had contract attorneys, and six percent represented
themselves. Fewer than one percent of petitioners in either state or federal
court had retained counsel at trial.
Although the overwhelming number of petitioners were represented by
counsel for their initial offense, most were not represented by counsel in
filing of the habeas corpus petitions. States are not obligated to provide
counsel for collateral attacks.2' Three-quarters of the petitioners in state
court and ninety-one percent of the petitioners in federal court represented
themselves. The number of pro se petitioners in federal court seems to have
increased since the 1970s when Robinson found seventy-nine percent of the
petitioners filing without an attorney.2  For the petitioners who were
represented by counsel in state court, twelve percent had court-appointed
counsel and seven percent had privately retained counsel. The remaining six
percent were represented by counsel but the records did not make it clear as
to how the counsel were obtained. Of the nine percent of the petitioners
represented by counsel in federal court, five percent of the petitioners were
represented by court-appointed counsel, three percent by retained counsel,
19. See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1988).
20. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), discusses representation in capital cases, and
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) discusses representation in noncapital cases; but most state
courts and all federal district courts can provide counsel to indigents if their claims show merit. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
21. Robinson, supra note 7, at 9.
[Vol. 31
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and the remaining one percent were represented by counsel whose appoint-
ment status was unknown.
Of the state petitioners in the sample, thirty-five percent were filing their
first petition, fifteen percent had filed one previous petition, seventeen
percent had filed two prior petitions, and the remainder filed three or more
prior habeas petitions. Of the federal petitioners, forty-six percent were
filing their first petition, eighteen percent their second, seventeen percent
their third, while the remainder had previously filed three or more petitions.
Using both the 1990 and 1992 data from habeas corpus petitions filed in
both state court and federal court, this research has confirmed earlier findings
that habeas petitioners have been convicted of serious offenses at jury trial
and have received long sentences. It makes sense that habeas petitioners
have longer sentences, because it takes such a long time to go through state
court proceedings to make it to the habeas corpus phase. More than half of
the federal petitioners have filed more than one habeas petition and roughly
sixty-five percent of state petitioners filed two or more habeas petitions.
Although most petitioners were represented by counsel at trial, most filed
habeas corpus petitions pro se.
III. TYPES OF CLAIMS RAISED
Which claims are raised by petitioners and against whom are they raised?
Before this important question is discussed, a couple of caveats are in order.
Claims are often handwritten by prisoners which were sometimes hard to
decipher. Although some petitions filed by prisoners were as concisely
drawn and specified claims as clearly as those prepared by an attorney,
others were difficult to read and contained claims difficult to identify.
Moreover, petitions selected were in very different stages of the process, for
example, some petitioners were filing their first petitions while others had
already filed multiple claims in state and federal court.
A question commonly asked is how many petitioners tend to file multiple
claims? Multiple claims are difficult to compare because what may be one
claim to one petitioner may be multiple claims to another. Some claims
raised were very specific whereas other were more general. For example,
one petitioner may claim counsel was ineffective for failure to call witnesses
(one claim), another would list failure to call each specific witness as a
separate claim, and a third would make the general claim of ineffective
assistance as well as several specific claims, (e.g., failure to call witnesses,
failure to communicate with the client etc.). To make these claims compa-
rable, all prisoner complaints were placed into the eight standard categories
shown in Table 4. By using petitioner as unit of analysis, any claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether general or specific, presented one
time or repeated several times, was counted as one claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. In other words, the response was dichotomized as: Did the
petitioner raise the claim in any form or did he not? Consequently, the
following number of claims shown in Table 3 is likely to be conservative.
9
Flango and McKenna: Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Table 3
Number of Claims Raised by Petitioners
State Claims Federal Claims
Number of Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Claims Petitioners Claims Petitioners Claims
1 593 32% 440 27%
2 532 29% 435 27%
3 331 18% 348 21%
4 162 9% 196 12%
5 74 4% 80 5%
6 41 2% 48 3%
7 26 1% 15 1%
8 22 1% 7 1%
9+ 16 1% 19 <1%
Unknown 38 2% 38 2%
Totals 1,835 99% 1,626 100%
This analysis is based upon the number of individual petitioners making
claims rather than the number of claims raised. Most petitioners (sixty-seven
percent of state petitioners and seventy-three percent of federal petitioners)
raise more than one claim per petition.
Claims made were categorized by the institution against whom the claim
was made, and also by amendment. For example, petitioners tended to find
fault with police for their arrest, prosecutors for their conduct during trial,
trial courts for their decisions made during the course of the trial, and their
attorneys for ineffective representation.22
Many claims classified under the amendments may also have been
included in other categories. Claims regarding evidentiary decisions,
procedural errors, and judge bias were included in the trial court error
category, but claims like insufficient evidence to convict were classified as
Fourteenth Amendment concerns because conviction is not the sole decision
of the trial court. Often it is the jury who votes to convict and the prosecu-
tor who decides to bring charges against the defendant. For example, certain
Sixth Amendment rights could have been classified as trial court error as
well. Speedy trial violations and denial of assistance of counsel are usually
the responsibility of the trial court judge. Because these claims are expressly
provided for in the Sixth Amendment, they were classified separately.
22. Classifying claims was very difficult and time consuming, because every petitioner had a different
story to tell and a different way to tell it. Although approximately 60 potential claims were listed on
coding instructions, still a high number of claims were placed in the "Other" category. It was important
to classify and then categorize the claims for analysis. Classification issues are discussed throughout the
claims section of this paper.
[Vol. 31
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Table 4
Types of Claims Raised
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners Raising Claims
State Federal
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 756 41% 736 45%
Trial Court Error 495 27% 474 29%
Prosecutorial Misconduct 209 11% 259 16%
Police Misconduct 84 5% 214 13%
Fifth Amendment 343 19% 372 23%
Sixth Amendment 233 13% 275 17%
Eighth Amendment 593 32% 351 22%
Fourteenth Amendment Concerns 656 36% 579 36%
No significant difference exists between claims raised in federal and
state court. Prisoners tend to raise the same claims in both types of court,
and to the extent that a trend exists, a slightly smaller proportion of claims
are raised in state court. The sole exception is in alleged errors at sentencing
and punishing phase of the proceedings-thirty-two percent of these Eighth
Amendment claims were raised in state court, compared to twenty-two
percent in federal court. This difference is partially explained by the fact
that the errors at sentencing and punishing include the excessive bail claim,
which in New York is the primary reason a petitioner files a state habeas
claim.? The high number of excessive bail claims in New York state
habeas petitions made the state court proportion higher.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Challenges to the competency of attorney representation were the most
commonly raised claim in both state and federal court. The Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees the right to counsel for criminal defendants, and the
Supreme Court has also recognized the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.24 In one sense, this claim is a precondition for all others because
ineffective assistance of counsel is a reason given for not previously raising
claims. Despite recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, petitioners still have
an incentive to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel or else they
cannot raise other issues not raised earlier or argue new evidence.'
23. See supra note 12.
24. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Mark Peake, Hoots v. Allsbrook: The
Fourth Circuit's Application of the Strickland Test for Determining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 505, 599 (1987).
25. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that a
defense counsel's failure to file timely notice of appeal with regard to petitioner's state court appeal did
not constitute 'cause' that excused procedural default to permit federal habeas review. Id. at 752-54. The
court held there is no constitutional right to pursue an appeal in state habeas, thus, any attorney error that
lead to the default of Coleman's claims in state court cannot constitute cause to excuse default in federal
habeas. Id. at 755-57.
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Of the 146 applications examined by Shapiro in Massachusetts, about a
quarter (twenty-six percent) claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.26 Of
the total 467 petitions in the Faust, Rubenstein, and Yackle study covering
all three years, sixty-seven (fourteen percent) claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel.27 The multi-site study of Robinson reported that 1,270 of 2,225
claims were attacks on convictions, as opposed to challenges to sentences,
conditions of confinement, or other claims.' Of the attacks on conviction,
forty-two percent included ineffective assistance of counsel as one of the
grounds. Accordingly, about twenty-three percent of all claims included
ineffective assistance of counsel.
This study found that the number of ineffective assistance claims has
greatly increased. Of the 1,835 petitioners in the state sample, 755 (forty-
one percent) raised the claim either generally or specifically.2 9 Of these 755
petitioners, 319 raised the general claim only, and another 317 raised a
particular claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The remaining 119 peti-
tioners raised a particular claim in conjunction with the general claim (Note
that these were only counted once in arriving at the total claims made). Of
the 1,626 petitioners in the federal sample, 736 (forty-five percent) claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel. Of these 736 petitioners, 408 raised the
general claim only, 200 raised specific claims only, and another 128 raised
the general claim in conjunction with one or more particular claim. General
claims included such allegations as the attorney lacked experience, violated
the attorney-client privilege, failed to file a claim or discovery motion, did
not meet with the defendant on a regular basis, or otherwise failed to prepare
adequately.
Jeffries and Stuntz conclude that most ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are not based on the counsel's failure to raise a federal claim or
defense, but rather involve the attorney's decision that affected the devel-
opment of facts at trial.3" They cite as examples the failure to offer a
character witness or alibi and to uncover and present exculpatory evi-
26. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 331.
27. Faust et al., supra note 7, at 688.
28. Robinson, supra note 7, at 12.
29. This percentage may be an underestimate. In California and Texas where habeas corpus is the
primary post-conviction remedy the proportion of ineffective assistance claims is 46 percent and 45
percent respectively. In Alabama and New York, the proportion ineffective assistance claims is partially
dependent on the relative portion of Rule 32 and Rule 440 petitions in the respective samples. Of the 223
habeas petitions in Alabama, only 53 (24 percent) contained claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
whereas 109 of the 158 Rule 32 petitions in the sample (69 percent) contained those claims. Together then
43 percent of the Alabama petitions contained ineffective assistance claims, a proportion close to the 45
percent and 46 percent represented in Texas and California. In New York, however, only seven petitions
of the habeas sample of 115 contained a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and these were filed
inappropriately. If the sample of 155 Rule 440 petitions is considered separately, the proportion of claims
increases to 41 percent.
30. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679 (1990).
[Vol. 31
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dence.3' In essence, the defendant argues that the evidence or a claim was
never properly presented due to the inadequate counsel received.
The specific claims of ineffectiveness, either raised separately, in
conjunction with other specific claims, or in conjunction with the general
claim were as follows:
Table 5
Specific Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners Raising Claims32
State Federal
Failure to Investigate 167 9% 125 8%
Failure to object to 153 8% 128 8%
admissibility/sufficiency of evidence
Failure to appeal or raise important 125 7% 49 3%
issues on appeal
Failure to call witnesses 42 2% 31 2%
Misled defendant 40 2% 30 2%
Failure to raise an affirmative defense 26 1% 13 1%
Failure to cross examine 26 1% 41 3%
Conflict of interest 25 1 % 10 1 %
These numbers should be interpreted cautiously. Specific ineffective
assistance of counsel claims raised are probably underestimated because some
petitioners did not raise specific claims, but just claim general ineffective
assistance of counsel. A great many general ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were raised for a variety of reasons. For instance, the claims argued
that the attorney lacked experience, the attorney failed to file motions for
discovery, the counselor violated the attorney-client privilege, the attorney
failed to ask for proper jury instructions, did not meet with the defendant on
a regular basis, or otherwise failed to adequately prepare. Therefore, a
review of the specific claims raised may be instructive.
In both state and federal courts, failure to investigate was the most
commonly specified claim, followed by failure to object to admissibility or
the insufficiency of evidence. These two claims were also the claims most
likely to be raised together. The claim that the attorney(s) misled the defen-
dant was often raised in the context where the attorney failed to explain
adequately the plea agreement and the consequences of the plea to the
defendant. Forty-three percent of the 152 petitioners in the state sample and
fifty percent of the 128 petitioners in the federal sample who claimed a
coerced guilty plea, also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.
31. Id. at 722.
32. These percentages are based upon multiple claims.
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Ineffective assistance was by far the largest claim made in Alabama,
Texas, and California with over forty percent of each state's claims being for
ineffective assistance of counsel. In New York, however, only twenty-two
percent of all claims were for ineffective assistance of counsel, still a large
percentage of claims, but a proportion noticeably lower than found in the
other three states. This low percentage is explained by the fact that most
state court petitioners in New York do not raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in state habeas petitioners, but raise them in Rule 440 peti-
tions." Only one percent of the New York state habeas petitioners filed
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, while forty-one percent of New York
state petitioners filing Rule 440 petitions raised ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
One possible explanation for the high ineffective assistance of counsel
claims may be that petitioners often claim ineffective assistance of counsel
to bypass certain procedural bars. For example, if an attorney failed to
object at trial, the petitioner will most likely be barred from raising that
claim at a later date because he or she did not preserve the record for appeal.
However, a claim that the counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
trial judge may be permitted.
Ineffective assistance of counsel was by far the most common claim
raised by both state and federal petitioners. Even so, most of these claims
are denied. Thus, it is important to articulate and understand the standard
one must satisfy to prove that petitioners have received ineffective assistance
of counsel. Strickland v. Washington articulates a two-prong test that the
courts are to apply in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.' First, a defendant must show that counsel's trial performance was
deficient (the "cause" prong)." The cause prong of the test is satisfied by
actual ineffective assistance of counsel or by some other factor that impeded
counsel's effort to comply with the state's procedural rules." Next, the
defendant must illustrate that the counsel's deficient trial performance so
prejudiced the defense as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial (the
"prejudice" prong)."
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.3 The U.S.
Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, one must examine whether counsel's conduct undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that the trial did not
33. See supra note 12.
34. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
35. Id. at 687.
36. IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS 12-11 (1994).
37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
38. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S,. 45 (1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[Vol. 31
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produce a fair and just result.39 The proper measure of attorney perfor-
mance is "reasonable" under the prevailing professional norms and the
defendant must show that the representation received fell below the objective
standard of reasonableness.' ° For the petition to succeed, the strong
presumption that the counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance must be overcome.4" It is not clear,
however, whether the court should examine the counselor's errors individual-
ly or cumulatively when determining whether deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.42 Applying the deficient performance standard
cumulatively would lead to more courts concluding that the counsel provided
was ineffective.43
A losing defendant can point to a list of evidentiary decisions by counsel
that could have been resolved differently: Did the counselor have enough
meetings with the defendant? Was the defendant adequately prepared for
trial? Was the counselor prepared? Should the attorney have called addi-
tional witnesses or perhaps not have called certain witnesses? Should the
attorney have asserted an affirmative defense? Did the attorney fail to cross-
examine properly or should he or she have objected to the prosecution's
questions or evidence? The Supreme Court in Strickland seemed to
recognize this problem by stressing that the reasonableness of the counsel's
challenged conduct must be judged on the basis of facts known at the time
of trial, not on the basis of hindsight.'
B. Trial Court Error
Whereas the previous set of claims asserted error on the part of the
attorney, this set of claims asserts error on the part of the trial court. Nearly
thirty percent of both state court and federal court petitioners claimed trial
court error. Unlike the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
were likely to be general, the claims against trial courts were quite specific.
Few petitioners, eighty-six state petitioners and forty-seven federal peti-
tioners, asserted the claim of trial court error without further specification.
Many of the general claims of trial court error included the claim that the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 687-88.
41. Id. at 690.
42. The Fourth Circuit has applied the standards in Strickland to each individual error of counsel to
determine whether counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Peake, supra note 24, at 601. In
Roach v. Martin, the Fourth Circuit examined the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
individually and concluded that the defendant did not receive deficient counsel. 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir.
1985) . Mark Peake's article noted that the Fifth Circuit applied the Strickland standard individually,
whereas the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits applied the standard individually and cumulatively.
43. However, in McNeil v. Cuyler, 782 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1986); Wilson v. McMacken 786 F.2d
216 (6th Cir. 1986); and United States v. Cruz, 785 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1986) the courts examined the
errors individually and cumulatively and still concluded that the defendants failed to satisfy the burden of
proving deficient performance and prejudice under the Strickland standard.
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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judge failed to explain the charges to the defendant. Most of the remaining
claims raised specific aspects of trial court error, including those from the
thirty-seven petitioners who made a particular claim in conjunction with the
general claim. Many of the general claims of trial court error included the
claim that the judge failed to explain charges to the defendant. The
following table summarizes our findings on trial court error.
Table 6




Failure to suppress improper evidence
Excluded excludatory/mitigating
evidence
Improper joinder/failure to serve
Biased judge
Abuse of discretion
Denied motion for self representation
Number/Percentage of Petitioners
State Federal
200 11% 136 8%
129 7% 156 10%
85 5% 171 11%
27 2% 25 2%
16 1% 11 <1%
15 1% 17 1%
12 1% 1 ---
6 <1% 6 <1%
Petitioners 490 522
Detrimental procedural error was the single most frequent trial court
error specified in state court, whereas failure to suppress improper evidence
was the single trial court error most often specified in federal court. In
addition to those listed above, detrimental procedural errors often included
lack of trial court jurisdiction and failure to admonish defendant on certain
rights.
C. Sixth Amendment Claims
Ineffective assistance of counsel was previously discussed above.
Additional Sixth Amendment claims are discussed separately here, although
some of these may be related to trial court error as well.45 Most of the
claims classified in this category relate to jury challenges.
Only fourteen general claims were raised in state court and only ten were
made in federal court. The general Sixth Amendment category was claimed
a total of twenty-four times and can be used to support the theory that the
petitioner often does not understand the criminal justice system. For
instance, one petitioner claimed that every time his or her attorney was called
up to the bench during trial, his or her Sixth Amendment right to be present
was violated. The following table details our findings pertaining to the
allegations classified as "Specific Sixth Amendment Claims":
45. See supra Part LI.B.
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Table 7
Specific Sixth Amendment Claims
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners
Jury improperly selected
Speedy trial























Sixth Amendment claims made in federal and state courts were similar.
Furthermore, the confrontation category was often used when the defendant
was improperly identified.
1. Errors at the Sentencing and Punishment Phase (Eighth Amendment)
Most Eighth Amendment claims could be considered a form of trial court
error because they deal with sentence and detainment issues. In addition to
the general claims made in state and federal court,' the following specific
claims were made:
Table 8




Challenge to sentence enhancement
Probation/parole issue
Cruel and unusual punishment





175 10% 149 9%
142 8% 22 1%
127 7% 68 4%
117 6% 35 2%
43 2% 57 4%
29 2% 15 1%
30 2% 44 3%
The most common Eighth Amendment claim raised was that the sentence
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excessive bail claims raised in state court and the only one percent raised in
federal court is explained by almost exclusive use of habeas corpus for
excessive bail claims in New York.47
Notwithstanding the excessive bail claims, most of the Eighth Amend-
ment claims are raised by approximately the same proportion of federal and
state petitioners. The challenge to sentence enhancement claims are asserted
when the petitioner believes a prior conviction should not have been used for
sentence enhancement. Sentence inconsistent with a plea bargain includes
claims that the prosecutor, defense counsel, or judge had broken a plea
agreement.
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct was claimed by eleven percent of the state
petitioners and sixteen percent of the federal petitioners. Nearly four percent
of the state claims (118) and six percent of the federal claims (seventy-five)
were general claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The specific claims raised
by petitioners refers to the prosecutor's conduct at trial and surprisingly does
not mention the prosecutor's decision to bring the charges against the
petitioner in the first place. The specific claim made most often by both state
and federal prisoners was failure to disclose. The types and number of
specific claims raised are listed as follows:
Table 9









70 4% 84 5%
37 2% 26 2%
23 1% 36 2%
18 1% 17 1%
6 <1% 7 <1%
Petitioners 154 170
E. Police Misconduct
In Stone v. Powell,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that prisoners are
precluded from using federal habeas corpus proceedings to assert illegal
search and seizure claims if provided a full and fair opportunity to be heard
in state court.49 This may explain the low number of Fourth Amendment
47. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the habeas petition in New York state.
48. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
49. Id. at 494
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habeas claims raised. Claims of alleged police misconduct were raised by
five percent of the petitioners from the state court sample and by thirteen
percent of the petitioners in the federal court sample. This finding is
contrary to the expectation from the Stone v. Powell decision that more
petitioners would raise the Fourth Amendment in the state court than in the
federal court. Most often the claim was specific-either unlawful arrest
(forty-six claims in state court (three percent) and 137 claims in federal court
(eight percent)) or illegal search and seizure (forty-seven claims in state court
(three percent) and 104 in federal court (six percent)). Only two general
Fourth Amendment claims were made in state court and only twenty-seven
in federal court.
F. Fifth Amendment
Petitioners raised only a few general Fifth Amendment claims (eleven in
state court and twelve in federal court):
Table 10
Specific Fifth Amendment Claims
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners
State Federal
Invalid/coerced guilty plea 152 8% 128 8%
Improper/defective indictment 0  73 4% 80 5%
Double jeopardy 48 3% 59 4%
Self-incrimination 30 2% 40 3%
Coerced confession 23 1% 6 4%
Grand jury issue 10 <1% 6 <1%
Petitioners 506 549
Invalid or coerced guilty plea includes claims that the defendant was not
informed of the consequences of the plea. This is particularly relevant where
a habitual offender statute exists. Some petitioners claimed that had they
been aware of these statutes and the resulting sentence enhancements, they
would not have pleaded guilty to the first offense.
G. Fourteenth Amendment Concerns
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. This guarantee grants prisoners the right to challenge
their criminal conviction resulting from fundamentally unfair trial proceed-
50. This category includes improper amendment to the indictment.
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ings. sl The claims included in this category could have been classified as
due process because they all involve claims that fundamental fairness was
denied. In addition to the general Fourteenth Amendment claims made
(forty-eight in state court and nine in federal court), the specific claims raised
are listed in Table 11.
Table 11
Specific Fourteenth Amendment Concerns
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners
State Federal
Due process/equal protection 243 13% 254 16%
Challenge to prison administration 180 10% 48 3%
Burden of proof/insufficient evidence 160 9% 220 14%
New evidence 78 4% 7 <1%
Denial of appeal 35 2% 53 3%
Petitioners 696 582
Due process claims and equal protection claims are ambiguous, but many
more of the former were raised. Equal protection claims were relatively easy
to identify, e.g. petitioner was housed in a segregated and deficient housing
unit. In contrast, due process claims raised tended to be general rather than
specific. Due process claims can be raised at any stage of processing, arrest,
pre-trial activities, trial, or appeal: whenever procedures employed by the
government denied the petitioner fundamental fairness,2 Some of the
claims classified as due process include failure to preserve evidence, denial
of a hearing, and failure to receive notice of charges.
One reason for the large number of due process claims is that many
petitioners claim their Due Process Clause through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to incorporate a provision of the Bill of Rights to the states.5 3 Peti-
tioners need to assert this due process claim, because the states cannot breach
the guarantees of the first ten amendments directly.54 The states are only
capable of violating those amendments insofar as those provisions are
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.55
51. See Leslie R. Stem, Note, Constitutional Law-Less Onerous Harmless Error Standard Applies
on Habeas Corpus Review-Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 172,
174 (1994).
52. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
53. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWACK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.2 (2d ed. 1986); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
54. See ROTUNDA & NOWACK, supra note 53, at § 14.2.
55. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
incorporated against the states, with the exception of the Second Amendment guarantee of the right to bear
arms, the Fifth Amendment right to prosecution only upon a grand jury indictment, and the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases. Id.
[Vol. 31
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Therefore, if a state violates the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, the state would be abridging the Fifth Amendment as applied
to it through the Fourteenth Amendment. It would be technically incorrect
to refer to the state as violating the Fifth Amendment without noting its
application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.56
The challenge to prison administration, ruling, or procedure commonly
involves the assertion that the prison administrator miscalculated or denied
the petitioner "good time" credits. It is interesting that petitioners tended to
raise this ten percent of the time in state court, but only three percent of the
time in federal court. This may be partially explained by the fact that
petitioners were complaining about "good time" credit which would facilitate
an earlier release. Thus, if petitioners are counting their "good time" credit
they may have been released before they would have reached federal court
with their habeas petition.
The categories of burden of proof not met or insufficient evidence to
convict also illustrate the petitioner's unfamiliarity with the criminal system.
For instance, defendant might have agreed to a plea agreement and then raise
a claim under insufficient evidence to convict.
H. Conclusions about Claims Raised
By far the largest category of claims raised by habeas petitioners was
ineffective assistance of counsel. This is not surprising considering that it is
natural to blame the lawyer when one has been convicted. Also, as
mentioned in the ineffective assistance of counsel section, it is easy to second
guess a lawyer's strategic decisions; such as calling or not calling a particular
witness. Petitioners may also raise ineffective assistance of counsel as an
excuse for not raising different claims either on appeal or in a prior writ.
Even though ineffective assistance of counsel claims were raised more than
any other claim, the stringent standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington"' makes it difficult for a petitioner to prove actual
ineffective assistance of counsel.53
Because most habeas corpus petitions are raised without counsel and
claims raised are not always clear, it is difficult to classify claims. It is often
difficult to know how to categorize petitions when some are very general
(e.g., due process was violated), and some are very specific. Petitioners
often assert that their rights have been violated when it is clear that they do
not understand the right guaranteed them under the Constitution. For
instance, petitioners claim insufficient evidence to convict when they plead
guilty (twenty-five of the 137 petitioners in state court and thirteen of the 199
petitioners who claimed insufficient evidence in federal court were convicted
56. Id.
57. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
53. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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by guilty plea) or they assert bias on the part of the judge when he calls the
defendant's attorney to the bench during trial, because the defendant was not
allowed to approach the bench along with his attorney.
Petitioners raise similar claims in state and federal court, except for
Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims. One reason may be that claims are
fixed at the state court phase and do not need to be reiterated at the federal
court level. Nevertheless, this fact strengthens the case of those who argue
that federal review of state court convictions are redundant.
Petitioners tend to raise the same type of claims on subsequent petitions
that they raise in the initial petitions, but experienced petitioners tend to raise
more claims. The exception is that petitioners raising subsequent claims in
federal court are more likely to claim ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV. COMPARATIVE SUCCESS OF CLAIMS
A. Petitioner Success Rates
Do petitioner success rates vary by the claims raised? Before that
question is answered, the point must be emphasized that very few petitions
in either the state or the federal courts were granted. Thus, any conclusions
drawn from success rates of petitioners must be tenuous. Of the 1,626
federal petitions in the sample, only seventeen were granted (two in
California, three in Alabama, five in New York, and seven in Texas). Of
the petitions filed in state courts; only one was granted in California and only
three were granted in Alabama. In New York, forty-eight petitions were
granted, however, of those granted forty-one were for excessive bail. In
Texas, granted petitions are filed in a separate location from petitions denied
or dismissed, therefore, it was possible to oversample granted petitions to
facilitate the comparison between petitions granted and denied. The
proportion of petitions granted in the sample is double the actual proportion
granted and so must be analyzed separately.59
The following table shows overall petitions granted, including the Texas
sample, by the types of claims made:
59. In the fiscal year 1992, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of 2,244 habeas corpus
petitions. Of the petitions disposed, 116 were sent back to trial courts for additional hearings, 152 were
filed and set for hearings, and eight were granted with orders. The remaining petitions were denied (56
with an order 1,812 without), dismissed (55), dismissed summarily for abuse of the writ (43), or
dismissed with no action necessary (two). Even assuming that all of the petitions filed and set would
eventually be granted, the petitioner success rate in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would be less
than eight percent. Figures contained in this footnote courtesy of Thomas Lowe, Clerk of Court, and
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Table 12
Rates at Which Petitions Are Granted
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners
State Federal
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 733 8% 707 <1%
Trial Court Error 483 6% 458 2%
Prosecutorial Misconduct 200 3% 248 <1%
Fourth Amendment 79 1% 209 < 1%
Fifth Amendment 330 5% 362 <1%
Sixth Amendment 221 1% 264 <1%
Eighth Amendment 582 10% 340 <1%
Fourteenth Amendment 639 6% 557 1%
This table shows that federal courts grant a very small proportion of
habeas corpus petitions, typically less than one in a hundred, and the claims
raised do not affect the petitioner's success rate. The picture in state courts
is somewhat different For prosecutorial misconduct as well as Fourth and
Sixth Amendment claims, petitioner's success rates in state court is
comparable to the low success rate in federal courts. The success rate for
Eighth Amendment claims, however, was markedly different with eleven
percent granted in state courts and less than one percent granted in federal
courts. Further analysis revealed that fifty-eight of the total 149 petitions
granted were from New York and that forty-four of the fifty-eight involved
questions of excessive bail. Eleven of the forty-four granted petitions
involved coerced guilty pleas.
Ineffective assistance of counsel, trial court error, and Fourteenth
Amendment concerns, are granted at higher rate in state courts. In order to
specify the particular claims responsible for this high success rate, individual
claims were examined separately. Moreover, the claims from the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals must be separated from the others, because
petitions granted in Texas were over-sampled in an attempt to enlarge the
sample of granted petitions. Consequently, the rate at which petitions in
state courts were granted will be compared with the rate at which federal
petitions were granted without the confounding influence of the Texas
sample. Table 13 lists both the number of petitions granted and the
percentage granted, because at times a large percentage change can be the
result of a relatively small number of petitions. The percentage refers to the
number of petitioners who raised that particular claim and had their petition
granted. For instance, four petitioners who raised ineffective assistance of
counsel as a claim had their petitions granted (three percent).
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Table 13
Prisoner Petitions Granted by Specific Claims Raised
Claims Raised Number/Percentage of Petitioners
Texas State Courts Federal Courts
Ineffective Counsel 4 3% 3 1% 3 1%
Failure to Investigate 4 6% 2 2% 1 1%
Failure to Object to Admissibility 2 4% 1 1% 0 0
Failure to Appeal 43 68% 0 - 1 2%
Trial Court Error
Improper Jury Instruction 2 5% 0 - 4 3%
Failure to Suppress
Improper Evidence 2 7% 1 2% 1 1%
Detrimental Procedural Error 23 29% 1 1% 3 2%
Eighth Amendment 0 - 2 17% 0 -
Excessive Sentence 1 4% 2 1% 1 1%
Challenge to Sentence Enhancement 2 5% 0 - 0 -
Conditions of Confinement 0 - 0 - 0 -
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 0 - 1 3% 0 -
Excessive Bail 3 30% 41 32% 0 -
Sentence Not Consistent with
Plea Bargain 4 4% 0 - 0 -
Probation / Parole Issue 2 2% 2 4% 0 -
Fourteenth Amendment 2 4% 1 2% 0 -
Burden of Proof 2 2% 0 - 2 4%
Denial of Appeal 20 77% 0 - 2 4%
New Evidence 0 - 1 1% 0 -
Challenge to Prison Administration 6 12% 0 - 0 -
Table 13 illustrates that failure to appeal, denial of appeal claims and to
a lesser extent detrimental procedural error were the claims most likely to be
granted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, but these were not
significant issues in the other state courts. Often, denial of appeal and
attorney failure to appeal were raised together-as in where a court refused
to grant an appeal because that the attorney failed to file an appeal on time.
Only the excessive bail claims in New York were granted in significant num-
bers.
Only prisoners with relatively long sentences have time to complete the
entire habeas process, because petitioners must appeal their convictions to
state courts and then exhaust state remedies before they can proceed to
federal court.' There is no way of knowing from the data gathered here
the extent to which early release dates resulted in the dismissal of habeas
petitions. It is clear, however, from the state sample that petitioners filing
a first petition claim had a better chance of having claims from that petition
60. Exhaustion will be discussed further in the section on Denying Habeas Petitions, see infra Part
I.E.
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granted (fifteen percent) than did prisoners who had filed claims before.
Perhaps meritorious claims are recognized and granted the first time they are
raised. This again weakens the argument that federal review is essential to
correct errors made in state courts. 6'
B. Does having counsel provide greater success in habeas proceedings?
Faust, Rubenstein, and Yackle found that professional representation was
"[t]he single most important predictor of success in federal habeas corpus"
and recommended legislation providing counsel in non-capital cases.'
Courts, however, often screen habeas petitions for merit and only those with
promise will have counsel assigned or appointed.63 Conclusions are also
hard to draw because of the very few habeas corpus petitions granted, and
information on counsel was not available in all of these. Nevertheless, of the
103 petitions granted by state courts where representation was known,
petitioners had counsel in sixty percent of them (sixty-two); of the 1,452
petitions dismissed or denied twenty-two percent of the petitions had counsel.
These numbers would seem to support the Faust, Rubenstein, and Yackle
argument that counsel should be appointed for habeas petitioners. However,
these numbers can be misleading because a number of the state petitions
granted were excessive bail claims which are made before trial with counsel
and are more likely to be granted.
Of the 444 habeas petitions by state prisoners denied in federal court, for
which information on counsel was available, ninety-four percent (417) did
not have legal representation. Only seventeen habeas corpus petitions were
granted by federal courts. This small number of federal petitions granted
make it very hard to draw any firm conclusions about counsel. Of the
seventeen petitions granted, information on counsel was available on sixteen
of these and of these, six had counsel, and ten did not. Given the small
number of petitions granted, it would not be prudent to appoint a lawyer for
every habeas petitioner. The practice of having the court appoint an attorney
only after screening identifies a meritorious claim should be continued.'
Because habeas claims are often filed pro se, they burden federal court staff,
especially magistrate judges, who must try to identify claims raised and to
determine whether or not counsel should be appointed. If no limits are
61. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247 (1988).
62. Faust et al., supra note 7, at 707.
63. "The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and
may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). There is no statutory or constitutional right for an indigent to
have counsel appointed in a civil case, the district court may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to employ counsel. Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971).
64. Most habeas petitions are filed pro se, but virtually all prisoners sentenced to death have
petitions prepared by attorneys. Hence the shortage of attorneys who represent petitioners is a more
serious problem in capital cases. See David Margolick, Texas Death Row is Growing, But FewerLawyers
will Help, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1993, at Al, A23.
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placed upon federal review of habeas corpus cases, perhaps more pro se law
clerks and staff attorneys should be added to staff.
C. Conclusions about Success Rates and Petitioners' Claims
In conclusion, the number of petitions granted by claim appears to be
rather uniform between state and federal courts, when the exceptions of
particular claims in Texas and New York are taken into account. Addi-
tionally, it must be stressed that even granted petitions may provide only
limited relief. There seems to be a common misconception that when habeas
petitions are granted, a petitioner is set free. In reality, granted petitions
may mean that bail is reduced for a petitioner, that the petitioner can appeal
his conviction, or the petitioner may be granted a new trial. The fact that
first petitions often have a better chance of being granted than subsequent
petitions tends to support the argument that subsequent review by either state
or federal courts is redundant.65
D. Court Reasons for Denying Habeas Petitions
In federal court, petitions are not only denied, but sometimes withdrawn
by the petitioner (often to enable claims to be exhausted), dismissed by the
court, or remanded. State courts often deny habeas petitions (less than ten
percent of state habeas petitions are dismissed). The term "denied" is
construed broadly here to include all petitions not granted.
In state courts, about seventy-five percent of the petitions were dismissed
or denied summarily without a reason whereas reasons for the denial were
given in almost three-quarters of the federal petitions. What are the primary
reasons' courts give for denying writs of habeas corpus? When state courts
articulate a reason for denial, they usually deny petitions on the merits or for
procedural default. The reasons are similar in federal courts, with the
addition of failure to exhaust state remedies. This was one of the primary
reasons for dismissing or denying petitions for relief, despite the fact that
prisoners filing habeas petitions in federal court often uses a standard form
that advises petitioners to exhaust state remedies. In a sense, this latter
reason is not a denial, but a postponement, because petitioners can raise these
claims again in federal court after the unexhausted claims are raised in state
courts.
65. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-75
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Case law is divided as to which reason takes precedence for denials
when several alternatives are available 6 The major reasons for denial are
discussed in more detail below.
E. Failure to Exhaust
The exhaustion doctrine was established by the Supreme Court in Ex
Parte Royall,67 which held that state prisoners should seek state court
remedies for their federal claims before presenting those claims in a petition
for federal habeas relief. The Court stated that the exhaustion doctrine is
fundamental in preventing unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound
to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.6" At the time of the
Ex Parte Royall decision, exhaustion was not considered a jurisdictional bar
and could be relaxed in circumstances justifying immediate federal adjudica-
tion. 9 Presently, the exhaustion doctrine routinely applies as a prerequisite
to addressing the merits of every federal habeas claim. 0
The Supreme Court in Darr v. Burford stated that "it would be unseemly
in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state
court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a
constitutional violation.""' To solve this tension, the courts apply the
doctrine of comity. This doctrine "teaches that one court should defer action
on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereign
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an
opportunity to pass upon the matter."'72 Federal prisoners must first present
their claims in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.73 Al-
though this requirement may create delay in adjudicating a prisoner's federal
habeas claim, it does serve to further the interests of federalism and comity.
The exhaustion requirement that is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and
(c)7 serves to minimize tension between federal and state systems of justice
66. See generally Wise v. Fulcomers, 958 F.2d 30 (3rd Cir. 1992) (preferring abuse of the writ over
failure to exhaust); Smith v. Black, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1992) (retroactivity should dominate
procedural default); but see Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992), (concluding that
procedural default trumps retroactivity).
67. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
68. Id. at 251.
69. Faust et al., supra note 7, at 251-53 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 254 (1884)).
70. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987); Pickard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
71. 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
72. Id.
73. See Granberry, 481 U.S. 129; Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
74. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either
an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the
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by allowing the state an initial opportunity to examine and rectify any alleged
violations of prisoners' federal rights.75 "An exception is made only if
there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective
process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain
relief. "76
In the early 1970's, the Supreme Court handed down decisions that
established the exhaustion doctrine as a barrier to federal adjudication. The
standards for exhaustion became much more stringently applied. The
Supreme Court in Picard v. Connor announced that the substance of a federal
habeas corpus claim must be fairly presented to the state courts before being
raised in federal court.' Not only must the petitioner have been through
the state courts, but the states must have had the first opportunity to hear the
claim.7" In this case, Connor did not bring up the equal protection claim
until he reached the United States Supreme Court, and therefore the state
courts never had a fair opportunity to consider and act upon this claim.19
The Court of Appeals held that respondent had exhausted available state
judicial remedies, because he had presented the state court with an opportuni-
ty to apply legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional
claim.' °
The Supreme Court rejected this view and held that the state courts need
more than an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing upon his constitutional claim.8" The exhaustion doctrine is not
satisfied if all the facts necessary to support a federal claim were before the
state courts, or even if the petitioner raised a somewhat similar state
claim. 2 The petitioner must raise the same constitutional issues in the state
courts that he or she wants the federal courts to address. Thus, it is not
enough for a petitioner to merely pass through the state court system on the
way to federal court-the state court must have considered every claim.
In Pitchess v. Davis, the Court reiterated the need for exhaustion of state
remedies and stated more clearly what it considered to be an exhausted
claim.' The Supreme Court held that the defendant did not exhaust state
remedies available to him as long as he had a right under state law to raise
that question presented.'l In this case, the denial of an application for a
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
Id.
75. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).
76. Id.
77. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971).
78. Id. at 276.
79. Id. at 276-77.
80. Id. at 271-72.
81. Id. at 276-77.
82. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).
83. 421 U.S. 482 (1975).
84. Id. at 487.
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writ of prohibition did not constitute an adjudication on the merits of the
claim presented.'5 Denial of an application for an extraordinary writ by
state appellate courts does not serve to exhaust state remedies where the
denial is not viewed as an adjudication of the merits of claims presented, and
where normal state remedies are available. 6 To satisfy the exhaustion doc-
trine, the state courts must have looked at the merits of the claims present-
ed. 7
In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court
must dismiss mixed petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims. 8 This furthers the exhaustion doctrine that protects the state court's
role in enforcement of federal law and prevents disorder of state judicial
proceedings.8 9 This exhaustion requirement is designed to encourage habeas
petitioners to exhaust all of their claims in state court and to present the
federal court with a single habeas petition.' The Court stated that both the
courts and prisoners should benefit, because as a result, the district court will
be more likely to review all of the prisoner's claims in a single proceeding,
therefore providing for a more focused and thorough review. 9'
If the petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the
petitioner has the option of returning to state court to exhaust his claim or
amending his habeas petition to present only his exhausted claims to the
district court.9" If the prisoner desires speedy federal relief of the habeas
claims, the prisoner can easily amend the petition to delete the unexhausted
claims, rather than returning to state court to exhaust all of his claims.93
If the petitioner chooses to amend his claim, however, he is running the risk
of forfeiting consideration of his unexhausted claims in federal court. Under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b), a district court may dismiss subsequent
petitions if it finds that "the failure of the petitioner to assert those new
grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ. 94
[I]f a petitioner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal
collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of
being granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason,
he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second
application presenting the withheld ground. The same may be true if...
the prisoner deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing.
Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to
85. Id. at 488.
86. Id. (citing Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116 (1944)).
87. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987). See also LARRY YACKLE, POST CONVICTION
REMEDIES §§ 52, 59-61 (1981).
88. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
89. Id. at 518.
90. Id. at 520.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 520-21.
93. Id. at 520.
94. Id. at 520-21.
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tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings
whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.'
Therefore, if the petitioner desires quick federal review and amends his or
her petition, the unexhausted claims may be barred from federal review at
a later date.
In Granberry v. Greer the Court held that when the state raises a non-
exhaustion defense for the first time at the United States Court of Appeals,
an appellate court is neither required to dismiss for non-exhaustion, nor
under any obligation to regard the state's omission as an absolute waiver of
the claim.9" The court should determine whether the interests of comity and
federalism will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by
requiring a series of additional state and district court proceedings before
reviewing the merits of the petitioner's claim.'
In Castille v. Peoples, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the extent
to which a petitioner who seeks federal habeas must exhaust state remedies
before resorting to the federal court.9" Justice Scalia writing for the
majority stated that the Court has previously rejected a finding that state
court remedies are not exhausted if there is any possibility of further state
court review available. In Brown v. Allen, the Court held that once the state
courts have ruled upon a claim, it is unnecessary for a petitioner "to ask the
state for collateral relief, based upon the same evidence and issues already
decided by direct review."99 The Court stated that it would be inconsistent
with the principle announced in section 2254 (b)'" and with the principles
of comity, "to mandate recourse to state collateral review whose results have
effectively been predetermined, or permanently to bar from federal habeas
prisoners in States whose post conviction procedures are technically
inexhaustible."'' Where the state court has already ruled upon the claim
or ignored the right presented, it would be useless to require further state
court proceedings." Where the claim, however, is represented for the first
time in a procedural context in which the merits will not be considered unless
"there are special and important reasons therefore," this does constitute "fair
presentation" and fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.'03
The exhaustion doctrine plays a very pertinent role in the denial of
federal habeas corpus petitions. Our study reveals that of the 3,346 federal
petitions, thirty-two percent (1,058 petitions) were denied or dismissed for
95. Id. at 521 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963)).
96. 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
97. Id. at 136.
98. 489 U.S. 346,-349-50 (1989).
99. Id. at 350 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 449 (1953)).
100. See Darr v. Buirrord, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
101. Castille, 489 U.S. at 350.
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failure to exhaust state remedies. Before a district court judge or federal
magistrate will examine the merits of the habeas case to determine if a
constitutional violation exists, the judge scrutinizes the procedural history to
determine whether the petitioner has exhausted his or her state remedies.
The judge will not examine the claims raised in the habeas petition if the
petitioner has not previously raised all of the issues in it at the state court
level. The Court wants to make sure that the state has a fair opportunity to
apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on his or her constitu-
tional claims."°4
Presently, satisfaction of the exhaustion doctrine occurs when the
petitioner presents all disputed claims to the state court before asking the
federal court to examine these claims," 5 the petition does not include both
unexhausted and exhausted claims,0 6 and the merits of the petitioner's
habeas claim were reviewed by the state court. 07 The state courts must
have had the opportunity to contemplate the issues raised in the petition that
is presently before the federal court.
F. Procedural Default
"A procedural default occurs in the habeas corpus context when a state
prisoner has exhausted his state remedies without obtaining any decision on
the merits of his federal constitutional claim, because he failed to comply
with state procedural rules on how the claim must be raised."'0 8  The
consequence of a procedural default is that the petitioner's federal claim will
never be heard in state court."0 9 The procedural default area in the habeas
corpus context presents two significant and conflicting government interests:
providing a federal forum to hear alleged constitutional rights violations and
reinforcing the procedural integrity of state court systems." 0
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Francis v. Henderson, addressed the issue
of whether a state prisoner who failed to make a timely challenge to the
composition of the grand jury that indicted him could challenge such grand
jury composition in a post-conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding."'
Under Louisiana law, any objection to the composition of the grand jury that
indicts a defendant must be made in advance of the trial. Otherwise, all such
104. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971).
105. Id.
106. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
107. Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944).
108. Stephanie Dest, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based
Interest Analysis, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1989) (quoting 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4266 (2d. ed. 1988)). For a summary of reasons used to
decline review based on procedural default, see Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights:
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE
(1987-1988).
109. Dest, supra note 108, at 266.
110. Id.
111. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
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objections are waived and thereafter not heard." 2 Francis never made any
objection to the composition before or during trial, and was found guilty. He
also never appealed the conviction.3
The Supreme Court held that the defendant could not challenge his
conviction in a habeas proceeding. The Court recognized that the federal
district court had the jurisdiction and power to consider the habeas writ, but
the Court attempted to discuss the appropriate exercise of this power." 4
In some circumstances, considerations of comity and concerns for orderly
administration of criminal justice require a federal court to exercise discretion
and refrain from exercising the courts' habeas corpus power." 5 The Court
concluded that Davis v. U.S., which stated that a federal prisoner who failed
to make a timely challenge to the allegedly unconstitutional composition of
his indicting grand jury could not attack the grand jury's composition after
his conviction in an action for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
applies with equal force when a federal court is asked in a habeas corpus
proceeding to overturn a state conviction due to an allegedly unconstitutional
grand jury indictment." 6 Delays make it hard to overcome the prima facie
claim which may be established by a defendant. Material witnesses and
grand jurors may die or leave the jurisdiction and memories may lose their
sharpness. Moreover, the decision may affect other convictions based on
indictments returned by the same grand jury." 7
Further, in Wainwright v. Sykes, the Supreme Court held that failure to
comply with a state procedural rule will bar habeas corpus review by a
federal court unless the defendant can show "cause" for his failure to comply
with the state rule and actual "prejudice" created by the default."' Sykes
presented a habeas corpus challenge based upon a Miranda claim that he had
not raised in his state trial." 9 At the defendant's murder trial, the prosecu-
tion introduced evidence of an incriminating statement that Sykes had given
to the police after having been warned of his Miranda rights. In his habeas
challenge, Sykes claimed that he had not understood the Miranda warnings,
and thus any statements made were involuntary, even though neither he nor
his counsel raised that claim prior to trial nor during the trial.120 Florida's
state procedural rule required that such claims be raised by a pretrial motion
to suppress, but it also granted the trial court discretion to entertain an
objection at trial.'
112. Id. at 537.
113. Id. at 537-38.
114. Id. at 538-39.
115. Id. at 539.
116. Id. at 541-42 (discussing Davis v. U.S., 411 U.S. 233 (1973)).
117. Id.
118. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
119. Id. at 75.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 76.
[Vol. 31
32
California Western Law Review, Vol. 31 [1994], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol31/iss2/3
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE CONVICTIONS
Did Sykes' failure to challenge his confession in compliance with
Florida's procedural rules bar federal habeas corpus review? The Supreme
Court decided that federal habeas review is procedurally barred when a
petitioner has waived objection to the admission of a confession at trial
absent a showing of "cause" and "prejudice.' The "cause" and "preju-
dice" exception ensures that a federal habeas court will still hear the federal
constitutional claim of a petitioner who, in the absence of such an adjudica-
tion, would be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." Sykes did not
advance any explanation for his failure to object at trial, and therefore did
not satisfy the cause and prejudice standard. 4
The U. S. Supreme Court left open for resolution in future decisions the
precise definition of the "cause" and "prejudice" standard and noted only
that it was narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia.'"
Murray v. Carrier is an important case in defining the "cause" and "preju-
dice" standards. 26 Murray addresses whether a federal habeas petitioner
can show "cause" for a procedural default by claiming that defense counsel
inadvertently failed to raise a substantive claim of error rather than
deliberately withholding it for tactical reasons.17
The Supreme Court, in reaching their decision that Carrier failed to
establish "cause" for the procedural default, stated the Constitution guaran-
tees criminal defendants a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not,
however, insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every
conceivable claim. 28  The mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the
factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim, does not
constitute "cause" to excuse a procedural default.'29 The Court stated that
the question of "cause" for procedural default is not decided on the question
of whether the attorney erred or on the kind of error counsel may have
made. '3 As long as the defendant does not receive ineffective assistance
of counsel, there is no unfairness in requiring the defendant to bear the risk
of attorney error that results in procedural default. The Court states that
"cause" for a procedural default is dependent on whether the prisoner can
show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's
122. Id. at 87.
123. Id. at 90-91.
124. Id. at 91.
125. Id. at 87 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay promulgated the deliberate bypass rule
which would make federal habeas review generally available to state petitioners absent a knowing and
deliberate waiver of the federal constitutional contention. Id.).
126. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
127. Id. at 481-82.
128. Id. at 486 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1982). Engle states that the mere fact
that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite
recognizing it does not constitute cause for procedural default. Id.).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 488.
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efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule.' Possible examples of
"cause" under this standard may include showing that the factual or legal
basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, that some interfer-
ence by officials made compliance impracticable, or that counsel was clearly
ineffective. 132
Additionally, the habeas petitioner must establish that the errors worked
to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with error
of constitutional dimensions. 133 It is not enough that any errors by counsel
had the possibility of prejudice. In conclusion, the Court held that petitioner
never alleged any external obstacle that may have prevented counsel from
raising his claim and disallowed any claim that counsel was ineffective.,34
More broadly, two scholars summarizing recent Supreme Court decisions on
habeas corpus concluded that "After a decade and a half of extensive
litigation, "cause" has come to mean, roughly, ineffective assistance of
counsel (defined as gross incompetence) or some serious misconduct by the
state (such as active concealment of information) that would have given rise
to the claim."' 35 Although the definition of "prejudice" is also unclear,
commentators conclude that "[i]t appears to mean something akin to a
reasonable probability that, had the claim been timely raised, the outcome of
the state proceeding would have been different."136
Federal and state courts apply the procedural default doctrine with some
regularity. In state courts, over seventy-three percent of the claims were
denied without giving any reason for the denial. Twenty-seven percent of the
petitions contained reasons, and seven percent of those (241 petitions) were
denied on procedural default grounds. In federal court, seventy-six percent
of all petitions contained reasons for their denial. Of the 3,346 federal peti-
tions surveyed, 207 petitions or a little over six percent were denied on
procedural default grounds. Of the procedural defaults where representation
was known, eight-two percent of state court petitions and ninety-one percent
of federal court petitions were filed without benefit of counsel.
G. Successive Petitions and Abuse of the Writ
Successive petitions and abuse of the writ are related reasons for denying
habeas corpus petitions. A successive petition is a second or subsequent
habeas corpus petition that raises the same claims that were previously raised
131. Id. The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel was articulated in Strickland v.
Washington. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
132. Id. However, the exhaustion doctrine would require that a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel be presented to state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for
procedural default.
133. Id. at 494 (citing U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)).
134. Id. at 497.
135. Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution 1993 SUP. CT, REV. 65,
112 (1994).
136. Id. at 113.
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and rejected in an earlier petition. An abusive petition is a second or
subsequent petition that raises a new claim that could have been raised in an
earlier petition.'37
The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the rules governing successive
petitions in Sanders v. United States.38  In essence, courts entertain
successive petitions unless to do so would constitute an abuse of the writ.
In turn, an abuse is found where a petitioner deliberately withheld the claim
from a previous federal petition or where the successive petition was clearly
filed in bad faith.'39 The U.S. Supreme Court has taken some steps to
limit multiple petitions. In re McDonald was decided in 1989 and the Court
denied a petitioner the opportunity to file a habeas corpus petition because
the prisoner had filed seventy-five "frivolous" petitions over a ten year peri-
od." Dissenters noted that in this division, the Court "bars its door to a
litigant prospectively."' 4' State courts do not have limits on successive
petitions.
Observers differ on the need to restrict prisoner access to court.
Robbins contends that prisoner cases are not causing the burden on courts,
but are the easiest group of cases to eliminate, whereas Alan Slobodin of the
Washington Legal Foundation assess that cases barred are factually specific
and involve excessive filings of an almost "recreational" nature.'42 The
American Bar Association recommends restrictions on filing successive
federal habeas corpus petitions. 43 Second or successive claims would be
dismissed summarily unless a new federal right was applicable retroactive-
ly, 1 new facts not previously discovered were introduced,145 or evidence
of actual innocence or a miscarriage of justice was produced. 46 In other
words, they attributed successive petitions not to "sandbagging" their claims,
but to peer lawyering, mixed petition rules, execution-date practices, new
counsel at later stages of the proceedings, and changes in the law."
The Federal Courts Study Committee's conclusion that the problem of
successive petitions is "overstated" is supported by this study.' 4  Only
137. ROBBINS, supra note 36, at 16-3.
138. 373 U.S. I (1963). For a discussion of the application of Sanders, see FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBcoMMIrrTEE REPORTS, July 1, 1990, at 475-77 [hereinafter
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE].
139. See Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3, 12-13 (Ist Cir. 1982); see also Green v. Carlson, 649
F.2d 285,286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied454 U.S. 1087 (1981) (single prisonerfiled over 500 habeas corpus
petitions).
140. 109 S. Ct. 993 (1989). See Alexander Wohl, Barred from Court, 8 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (Feb.
1994).
141. Wohl, supra note 140, at 45.
142. Id. at 45.
143. Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990).
144. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
145. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992); Townsend v Sain 372 U.S. 293 (1983).
146. Kuhlman, 477 U.S. 436; McCleskey, 499 U.S. 467.
147. Robbins, supra note 143, at 170-88.
148. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrTTEE, supra note 138, at 471.
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seventeen state habeas petitions and sixty-seven federal petitions were denied
because they were successive petitions. The numbers involving an abuse of
the writ were similar: only eleven state habeas petitions and eighty-eight
federal petitions were denied for this reason. All of the petitions denied
because they were successive petitions or abuses of the writ in state courts
were filed pro se. Similarly in federal court, of the cases where representa-
tion status was available, twenty-seven of the twenty-eight petitions denied
on the grounds that they were successive petitions and thirty-four of the
thirty-seven petitions that were denied on the grounds of abuse of the writ
were filed by prisoners who did not have the benefit of counsel. The pro-
portion of petitions granted by type of claim appears to be very low and
rather uniform between state and federal court, when the exceptions of
particular claims in Texas and New York are taken into account. Petitioners,
however, are filing multiple petitions, and data provided in Section II above
show that over half of the federal petitioners in the sample filed more than
one habeas petition and roughly sixty-five percent of state prisoners filed two
or more petitions. Nevertheless, the courts, both state and federal, are not
generally using abuse of the writ and successive petitions as reasons to deny
habeas petitions.
H. Summary
State courts typically do not give reasons for denial. When state courts
articulate a reason for denial, it is most likely to be procedural default or
denial on the merits. Reasons for denying habeas petitions are more often
given by federal judges. Federal judges overwhelmingly deny petitions on
the basis of failure to exhaust state remedies and denied on the merits. A
good portion of federal petitions are also denied for procedural default
reasons. Comparatively few habeas petitions are denied based upon succes-
sive petitions or abuse of the writ.
CONCLUSION
Robbins argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has not consistently applied
a single overarching theory of habeas corpus review.'49 He lists three
competing theories: "the constitutional model" which focuses on the
importance of habeas corpus as the remedy for constitutional violations, "the
process model," which emphasizes the importance of habeas as a remedy to
correct flaws in lower court processes, and "the innocence theory," which
stresses the importance of habeas as a remedy for constitutional violations
that are supplemented with a claim of factual innocence. 150
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How well has this intensive research effort, the first to encompass a
study of habeas corpus petitions terminated in both state and federal courts,
accomplished its goal of changing the character of the debate? The answer
to this question must be discussed separately for habeas corpus petitioners
under the sentence of death and other petitioners.
The findings from noncapital cases in this research should reduce
tensions between state and federal courts. Federal courts are simply not
overturning state court convictions by granting a large number of habeas
corpus petitions. Indeed, so few petitions from state prisoners were granted
by federal courts that a planned separate analysis of characteristics of
petitions granted versus those denied had to be abandoned. Without that
analysis, it is not possible to 'Make recommendations on which aspects of
state court process or procedure need to be reformed to avoid federal
oversight. This finding can be interpreted to mean that state courts are
largely effective in protecting federal constitutional rights and weakens the
argument that federal review is a necessary safeguard against errors made in
state courts.15' Proponents of expanded federal review, however, could use
this same evidence to weaken the argument that federal review is a challenge
to finality. After all, in an overwhelming number of cases, the judgment of
the state trial court is affirmed. The public perception that prisoners are
being released on "technicalities," such as habeas corpus, is simply not
accurate.
The impact of counsel on success rates is unresolved in these cases for
the same reason-so few were granted that differences in representation were
not meaningful. Moreover, the issue is complicated by the fact that attorneys
are more likely to be appointed to cases exhibiting some merit, and thus
conflicting interpretations could explain any differences found: Is it that
petitions filed by attorneys were more likely to be granted or that, when
screened, petitions with merit were more likely to have counsel appointed?
The argument that federal review of state convictions is a duplication of
effort'5 2 is given support here. A comparison of claims raised in state
court with claims raised in federal court shows great similarity between the
two. With a few minor exceptions, notably with Fourth Amendment and
Eighth Amendment claims, similar claims are raised in both state and federal
courts. Ineffective assistance of counsel, and general due process concerns
overall were claims raised by most petitioners in both state and federal
courts. This result is not unexpected, as not only is it common to blame the
lawyer for a loss, but in some instances, it is necessary to give ineffective
assistance of counsel as a reason for not raising particular claims earlier in
the process or in a timely manner.
Claims raised do vary by state. For example, habeas is often used to
challenge pleas where the defendant claims a failure to be informed about:
151. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 61.
152. See supra note 65.
37
Flango and McKenna: Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW[
the habitual offender statute in Alabama; sentence enhancements in
California; excessive bail in New York; and appellate processes in Texas.
Overall, however, not only are new claims not raised in federal court, but
the chance of having petitions granted is slim indeed. Less use was made of
the "successive petitions" or "abuse of the writ" as reasons for denial of the
petitions than was anticipated, perhaps because the relevant decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court are so recent. Prisoners stand the best chance of having
their petitions granted the first time a habeas corpus petition is presented to
a state court. Subsequent petitions are less likely to be granted, regardless
if they are filed in state or federal court.
Only petitioners sentenced to long terms have the time to surmount the
procedural steps which are a prerequisite to filing a habeas corpus petition.
Overwhelmingly, these are prisoners who have committed serious offenses
and were sentenced to long terms after a jury trial. Many of these habeas
petitions are filed in both state and federal courts.
Petitioners do, however, have the opportunity to submit multiple
petitions to both state and federal court. Impressionistic evidence from
examining the files and interviewing court staff leads to the conclusion that
prisoner petitions are considered seriously and are not dismissed summarily.
Because habeas claims are often filed pro se, they present much work for
federal court staff, particularly magistrate judges, who must try to identify
the claims raised and determine whether or not counsel needs to be
appointed. Most federal courts also employ pro se law clerks to assist with
petitions. Magistrate judges and pro se law clerks do a commendable job in
identifying claims raised and in evaluating the merits of petitions. On the
other hand, habeas corpus petitions are a relatively small proportion of the
federal court workload in most districts. The data indicate that only a small
proportion of prisoners file habeas corpus petitions, although a few prisoners
file a large number of petitions. If no limits are placed on federal review of
habeas corpus cases, perhaps additional support for pro se law clerks and
staff attorneys who screen these petitions should be considered. That same
type of support is even more essential in state courts and may reduce the
number of petitions not resolved, but rather postponed for failure to exhaust.
A survey of judges' attitudes toward habeas corpus petitions is necessary to
determine the consequences of receptivity toward habeas corpus petitions and
petitions filed. At least a few judges interviewed expressed the opinion that
writing petitions was a rehabilitative and therapeutic exercise for prisoners.
These general conclusions are intended to focus discussion on habeas
corpus reform in general and do not apply necessarily to habeas corpus
reform in capital cases. As Hoffman and Stuntz note, "Because the federal
constitutional rights that are unique to death penalty litigation . . . may
substantially differ from the rights that exist in non-capital cases, habeas law
should perhaps differ as well."' 53 A separate study to track the legal
153. Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 135, at 119.
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history of all prisoners sentenced to death is needed to determine how
frequently these prisoners use habeas corpus as part of their overall defense
strategy.
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